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INTRODUCTION
It is a great pleasure for me to take part in this symposium marking
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Michigan Journal of International
Law. During these years, the journal has contributed to the development
of the science of international law and, with the Michigan Law School,
has played a distinct role in promoting trans-Atlantic dialogue between
the United State and Europe. Judging from the participants, this sympo-
sium is another manifestation of this on-going dialogue.
The general topic on which we are called to make contributions con-
cerns diversity and fragmentation of the international legal order. This is
certainly an important and timely theme since international law is be-
coming ever more complex both at a normative level, with an increasing
variety of specialized branches of law, and at the institutional level, with
the proliferation of courts and tribunals, agencies and organizations pos-
ing the problem of overlapping competences and possible conflicts of
jurisdiction. The specific topic I am proposing to address in this presen-
tation concerns culture and the way in which its products and
processes-what I call cultural heritage-have stimulated the emergence
of new norms and new actors in international law. Culture represents a
manifestation of diversity among the States that compose the interna-
tional community. At the same time culture is also an element of
diversity within the State. To the extent that culturally distinct groups
exist within a State, the enjoyment of their own culture contributes to the
pluralism of national societies and to the articulation of the State in a
multiplicity of social actors that often seek international recognition if
* Professor of International Law and Human Rights, European University Institute,
Firenze, and University of Siena.
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not a true international legal status. Such new actors include ethnically
distinct communities, minorities, indigenous peoples, non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) and religious groups to mention just a few exam-
ples. With the removal or at least the reduction of governmental barriers
to the free flow of cultural communication and exchange between differ-
ent States, the international role of these non-state actors has increased.
Hence, the problem arises, as indicated in the title of this symposium,
whether the emergence of these different voices onto the international
plane is likely to increase diversity or cause cacophony, which is a dif-
ferent word for saying disharmony, discord, or even anarchy. This is a
much debated subject today, and legal literature, including some contri-
butions in this symposium, has abundantly covered the implications of
the emergence of private actors, such as individuals, NGOs and trans-
national corporations, as participants in the law making process, tenants
of rights and as potential addresses of international obligations. The role
of these non-state actors has been analysed both in terms of contributions
that they may bring toward a more democratic governance of human so-
ciety,' but also in terms of increased risks that a culturally oriented
deconstruction of the general category of citizenship may pose for the
unity of the State and the orderly management of international relations.
In this paper I will try to explore the topic from a different perspec-
tive: i.e. the emergence of cultural heritage as part of the shared interest
of humanity, with the consequent need for international law to safeguard
it in its material and living manifestations, including the cultural com-
munities that create, perform and maintain it. Culture in itself is not
extraneous to the formation of the modern nation State. Especially in the
history of nineteenth century Europe, culture as language, religion, liter-
ary and artistic traditions provided the cement and the legitimizing
element to support the claim to independent statehood. In the second part
of the twentieth century it provided the political foundation for the right
of self-determination of peoples striving to form their independent State.
This history has also influenced the language of international law where
the link between individuals and the State has been identified in terms of
nationality rather than citizenship. However, in the contemporary world
the case of a State totally coinciding with a culturally homogeneous na-
tion is the exception rather than the rule. Today, within most States there
is co-existence of different cultures, traditions, minorities. In some States
these cultural differences are filtered and distilled into a higher idea of a
common polity, attracting a superior allegiance from the people. In oth-
ers, diversity is maintained through a constitutional equilibrium of
1. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Theories of Justice, Human Rights and the Constitu-
tion of International Markets, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 407 (2003).
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power-sharing (as in Switzerland) or through the integration of diversity
into a true multicultural society founded on constitutional guarantees of
fundamental freedoms and human rights (as in the United States). In
other cases, culture can become the source of intolerance, claims for
separation, and sometimes for violent oppression and ethnic conflict.
International law has not remained indifferent to this dynamic of cul-
ture within the State and between the States. Protection of minorities, as
addressed in post World War I peace treaties and ad hoc treaties, has
helped deconstruct the sovereign State by legitimizing the claim to an
international status of culturally distinct groups.2 Universal human rights
law has confirmed this status with Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,3 and has provided the foundation for the gradual
building up of a movement toward the recognition of a distinct and en-
hanced status of indigenous peoples.4 At the same time, international law
has played a constructive role in furnishing the intellectual basis to mod-
els of supranational integration (as in Europe) which build upon a
common core of traditions, democracy, human rights, the rule of law,
and economic freedoms. From this common core of cultural values a
proto-federal structure transcending the nation State and a new trans-
national constitution' is currently developing.
2. See, e.g., Treaty between the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan,
and Poland, signed in Versailles, June 28, 1919 (so-called Polish Minorities Treaty), available
at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/l1920/12.html, which sets the pattern for all
of the other post-World War I treaties on minorities, including e.g.; Paris Treaty between the
Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Romania, Dec. 9, 1919 (so-called Romanian Mi-
norities Treaty), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/l1920/13.html;
S~vres Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, and Greece, concerning
Thrace, Aug. 10, 1920, available at http://www.lib.byu.edu/-rdh/wwi/versa/sevresl.html. In
recent times, the movement for the recognition of the rights of culturally distinct groups has
led to the adoption of relevant international legal instruments, both of binding character (see,
Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, International
Labor Organization Convention No. 169, 72 ILO Official Bull. 59 (1989), entered into force
Sept. 5, 1991, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/rlcitp.htm) and non-
binding character (see, e.g., the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belong-
ing to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, U.N. GAOR,
47th Sess., Agenda Item 97(b), U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/135 (1993)).
3. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that:
"[i]n those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their
own language." International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 179, 6 I.L.M. 368, 375-76.
4. This movement has especially led to the adoption of the Convention Concerning
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, supra note 2.
5. The term "transnational constitution" in relation to the evolving system of commu-
nity law was used by an eminent member of the Michigan Law School Faculty, Professor Eric
Stein, in his seminal article; Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of a Transnational
Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981).
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Given this very broad and complex background, an examination of
the manifold manifestations in which culture creates an international
entitlement for human groups (non-state actors) would occupy much
more space and time than what I am allowed. So, I will concentrate my
analysis on the more technical aspects of the way in which international
law has articulated the relevance of cultural heritage in normative terms.
I will identify three separate facets of such articulation: 1) the protection
of cultural heritage and cultural groups as part of the protection of hu-
man rights; 2) the emergence of the concept of individual criminal
responsibility for cultural crimes; 3) the emerging notion of "cultural
diversity" as a general interest for whose protection the international
community "as a whole" must mobilize.
I. CULTURAL HERITAGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The UN Charter does not contain specific clauses connecting culture
to human rights. In 1948 the UN General Assembly rejected the notion
of "cultural genocide." 6 Yet, the development of international law since
then provides evidence that the protection of human rights, now part of
positive international law, extends to culture and cultural heritage of
peoples.
First, the concept of human dignity, which informs the human rights
provisions of the Charter and of the Universal Declaration (". . . recog-
nition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of
all members of the human family . .. ")' includes peoples entitlement to
the respect of the cultural heritage that forms an integral part of their
identity, history and civilization. Destruction or desecration of symbolic
objects and sites that are essential to the enactment of a people's culture
(be it a library, a place of worship, a sacred site for indigenous peoples)
is a violation of their collective dignity no less than a violation of their
personal dignity.
Second, Article 22 of the Universal Declaration states that everyone
. is entitled to realization.., of... cultural rights indispensable for
his dignity."8 Article 18 guarantees the right to freedom of conscience
and religion which is an integral part of one's culture.9 Article 27 pro-
6. See U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 83d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.83 (1948). See also
Background Paper Genocide, ST/DPI/ SER.A/68 (Nov. 1951).
7. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess.,
Pt. I, Resolutions, at 71, at pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
8. Id. at art. 22.
9. Id. at art. 18 (stating that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom,
1212 [Vol. 25:1209
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claims the "... right freely to participate in the cultural life of the com-
munity ... " and ". . . to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits."' ° These rights have been confirmed by
Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights." Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights has been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee in
a way to ensure special entitlement to minorities and indigenous peoples
to have access to natural resources. 2 It goes without saying that these
provisions create not only a negative obligation not to interfere with cul-
tural freedoms, but also a positive obligation to take steps to protect
cultural groups and communities in their exercise of such freedoms and,
in particular, to protect cultural and religious property which provide the
indispensable situs for the practice of such freedoms. Destruction of
mosques and libraries in Bosnia, and subsequent destruction of Orthodox
churches in Kosovo after NATO "liberation," stand as dramatic evidence
of the linkage between human rights and cultural heritage. This linkage
was well identified and stressed by the Special Rapporteur of the Com-
mission on Human Rights in his report on the situation of human rights
in Yugoslavia. 3
Third, the exponential growth of international cultural property law
in the past fifty years bears witness to the emergence of a new principle
according to which parts of cultural heritage of international relevance
are to be protected as the common heritage of humanity. This principle is
valid both in the event of armed conflict and in peacetime. During
armed conflict, the 1954 Hague Convention, 4 now ratified by 109
either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.")
10. ld. at art. 27.
11. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3. Article 15(l)(a) states that "[t]he State Parties to the present Covenant recog-
nize the right of everyone: to take part in cultural life... "
12. See Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, Communication No. 167/1984 (Mar. 26 1990),
available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/session45/167-1984.htm.
13. See the Report on the situation of human rights in former Yugoslavia prepared by T.
Mazowiecki pursuant to Commission resolution 1992/S- I of Aug. 14, 1992, where he writes:
[alithough the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not regarded as a religious
one, it has been characterized by the systematic destruction and profanation of
mosques, Catholic churches and other places of worship, as well as other sites of
cultural heritage. This has been reported to be the case particularly in areas cur-
rently or previously under the control of Serb forces . .. Some Orthodox churches
have been destroyed in areas of central Bosnia and Herzegovina which were or are
under the control of the Government and/or Croat forces.
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/50, Feb. 10 1993, para. 106.
14. See Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict, Aug. 7, 1956, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
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States'5 and de facto applied by many non-parties as expression of gen-
eral principles of international law, 6 recognizes that "... damage to
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to
the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contri-
bution to the culture of the world."'7 In peacetime, the 1972 World
Heritage Convention, whose parties are now numbering 172, confirms
the same principle with respect to cultural and natural heritage as an out-
standing universal value and requires that the "State Parties to this
Convention recognize that such heritage constitutes a world heritage for
whose protection it is the duty of the international community as a whole
to co-operate.' 8
Fourth, the relevance of this treaty practice for the present discussion
is further proven by the fact that cultural rights of individuals, groups
and of humanity as a whole are guaranteed not only in inter-state rela-
tions, as in the case of international conflicts, but also in relation to
purely domestic situations where the issue of the protection of cultural
heritage arises within the territory of the State. The destruction in 2001
of the great Buddhas of Bamyian, as part of the Taliban's delirium of
cultural cleansing, attracted protests and condemnation by States, includ-
ing Islamic States, the UN, UNESCO, the EU, and other international
organizations. '9 The mobilization of shame against such act has led to the
adoption by the UNESCO General Conference in October, 2003 of the
Declaration on Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, which is
intended to prevent the repetition of such acts in the future. °
15. The updated list of State parties is available at http://erc.unesco.org/cp/
convention.asp?KO= 13637&language=E.
16. The United States, whose ratification has been pending in the Senate for the past ten
years, has applied the Hague principles in its military manuals. The Operational Law Hand-
book treats the Hague rules as norms of customary law and the international section of the
legal office of the department of defence systematically trains military personnel on the re-
spect for cultural property, on the prohibition of their use for hostile purposes, on the
interpretation of military necessity and prior warning in case of unavoidable use of force.
17. Hague Convention, supra note 14, at pmbl.
18. Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16,
1975, art. 6, para. 1, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151.
19. See the practice cited in Roger O'Keefe, World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to
the International Community as a Whole?, 53 INT'L & COMP. LQ. 189, 195-202 (2004).
20. See UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heri-
tage, UNESCO General Cong., 32d Sess. (adopted by consensus Oct. 17 2003). On the
destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan, see Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The
Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 619
(2003) (this article was part of a larger study commissioned by UNESCO to Professor Fran-
cioni with the view of defining the legal framework for the adoption of the above Declaration).
For a reductionist and State oriented view of international law on the subject, see O'Keefe,
supra note 19, who recognizes that wanton destruction of cultural heritage of great importance
may not be shielded by domestic jurisdiction but, contradictorily, fails to recognize that such
1214 [Vol. 25:1209
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II. CULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
While it is clear that today the violation of international standards on
the protection of cultural heritage of any people may attract State respon-
sibility,2' it is especially with regard to individual criminal responsibility
that one can find the most significant developments in contemporary prac-
tice. At the time of this writing, Prosecutor v. Strugar2 is pending before
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY). This legal ac-
tion is based on an indictment that charged the defendant with violations
of the laws and customs of war and in particular with "unjustified devas-
tation, unlawful attacks on civilian objects, destruction or wilful damage
to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and
sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science.2 3 This case
is especially interesting because it concerns the bombing of the old city
of Dubrovnik, a site inscribed in the UNESCO World Heritage List,
which makes it of indisputable universal relevance for humanity as a
whole. Strugar, in his capacity as commander of the Yugoslavian army,
was responsible for the bombing of the city of Dubrovnik. He was in-
dicted for intentional destruction of cultural property of great interest for
humanity as a whole.
In March, 2004, the ICTY enacted its judgment on another case
regarding the shelling of the old town of Dubrovnik perpetrated in 1991,
holding that "the crime of destruction or wilful damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion, charity, education, and the arts and
sciences, and to historic monuments and works of art and science ...
destruction may constitute an international wrongful act just because of the general interest of
the international community in preventing such discriminatory and arbitrary destruction.
21. The principle of State responsibility for intentional destruction of cultural heritage
of importance to humanity is included in paragraph VI of the UNESCO Declaration Concern-
ing the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, supra note 20, which reads: "[a] State
that intentionally destroys or intentionally fails to take appropriate measures to prohibit, pre-
vent, stop, and punish any intentional destruction of cultural heritage of great importance for
humanity, whether or not it is inscribed on a list maintained by UNESCO or another interna-
tional organization, bears the responsibility for such destruction, to the extent provided for by
international law." International responsibility for violations of the rules on the protection of
cultural heritage has also been spelled out in Article 38 of the Second Protocol to the Hague
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event Of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26,
1999, available at http://www.unesco.org/culture/laws/hague/html]eng/protocol2.shtml (here-
inafter Second Protocol) which includes "the duty to provide reparation." Article 31 of the
Second Protocol provides also that the Parties undertake to act, jointly through the Committee
(the treaty body established to oversee the implementation of the Protocol), or individually, in
cooperation with UNESCO and the United Nations, and in conformity with the Charter of the
United Nations. See id. at art. 31. Thus, Article 31 implies the possibility of enforcing State
responsibility through sanctions.
22. Prosecutor v. Strugar, ICTY Case No. IT-01-42-PT (ICTY Judgment, third amended
indictment filed Dec. 10, 2003).
23. See id. at Counts 4-6.
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represents a violation of values especially protected by the international
community."24 The ICTY added that such crime, being perpetrated
against a site protected by the World Heritage List on behalf of
humankind as a whole, "is ... of even greater seriousness" since it was
directed "on an especially protected site...
But what is the legal basis for affirming the responsibility of the in-
dividual for cultural crimes? Since 1954 the principle that serious
violations of norms relating to the protection of cultural heritage may
entail international criminal liability has been recognized in various in-
ternational instruments. The 1954 Hague Convention recognizes this
principle at Article 28.26 The 1977 Protocol I additional to the Geneva
Convention contains a specific provision extending the obligation to
suppress grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Convention to acts of "ex-
tensive destruction" of cultural property to which special protection has
been accorded within the framework of a competent international or-
ganization.27 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia has expanded the scope of individual criminal liability for
cultural crimes by including such crimes in the category of violations of
the laws and customs of war.28 Similarly, the 1998 Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court includes attacks on cultural heritage in the
29category of war crimes.
The most advanced and detailed provisions on individual criminal li-
ability for serious violations of international norms on the protection of
cultural heritage are to be found in the 1999 Protocol additional to the
24. Prosecutor v. Jokic, Judgments Int'l Trib. for the Prosecution of Persons Responsi-
ble for Serious Violations of Int'l Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, Case No. IT-01-42/1-S, at para. 46 (Mar. 18, 2004).
25. Id. at para. 53.
26. See Hague Convention, supra note 14, art. 28 (stating that "[t]he High Contracting
Parties undertake to take, within the framework of their ordinary criminal jurisdiction, all
necessary steps to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon those persons, of
whatever nationality, who commit or order to be committed a breach of the present Conven-
tion)*"
27. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977,
art. 85, para. 4(d), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter Protocol I). See also, id. at art. 53 (prohibiting
attacks, military use of, as well as reprisals against, cultural heritage).
28. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, as
amended May 19, 2003 by Resolution 1481, available at http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/
index.htm (hereinafter ICTY Statute). Article 3(d) provides that violations of the laws and
customs of war shall include "seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions
dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and
works of art and science." Id. at art. 3(d).
29. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, circulated as document July
17, 1998, art. 8(2)(b)(ix)(applicable to international armed conflicts) and art. 8(2)(e)(iv) (ap-




1954 Hague Convention. ° This protocol was negotiated and adopted in
order to reinforce the rather weak system of the Hague Convention in the
face of the devastation brought upon cultural heritage in the conflicts of
the 1980s and 1990s, especially the Iraq-Iran war and the Balkan con-
flict.3' This protocol applies in its entirety to international and non-
international armed conflicts and it is entering into force just at the time
of this symposium. 32 Chapter 4 of the Protocol introduces the principle of
universal jurisdiction over the most "serious violations" of the norms
protecting cultural heritage.3 3 Article 17 obliges the party in whose terri-
tory the offender is present to prosecute or extradite that person
regardless of his or her nationality or of the place where the offence was
committed.
The link between the international protection of cultural heritage and
individual criminal responsibility has not remained confined to its mere
enunciation in conventional and statutory provisions in international in-
struments. It has been increasingly articulated and fleshed out in the case
law of international courts and tribunals, especially of the ICTY. Besides
the case of Prosecutor v. Joki6,34 where cultural crimes have been recog-
nized as independent counts of criminal liability under the laws and
customs of war, several precedents can be identified which elaborate a
typology of connections between cultural heritage and individual crimi-
nal responsibility. Thus, the act of destruction of cultural property with
discriminatory intent toward a culturally distinct group, besides being
capable of autonomously falling under the rubric of war crimes, has been
considered to be an element of crimes against humanity, specifically of
the crime of persecution within the meaning of Article 5(h) of the ICTY
Statute. This principle has been applied in the 2001 decision of Prosecu-
tor v. Kordic & Cerkez. Addressing the acts of deliberate destruction of
ancient mosques in Bosnia Herzegovina, the ICTY held that:
30. See Second Protocol, supra note 21.
31. See Patrick J. Boylan, Review of the Convention for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/tmages/0010/001001/
100159eo.pdf (1993).
32. Article 43 states that the protocol "shall enter into force three months after twenty
instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession have been deposited." Second
Protocol, supra note 21, art. 43. The twentieth instrument of ratification or accession was
deposited (by Costa Rica) on Dec. 9, 2003, thus the Protocol entered into force on Mar. 9
2004. The States parties are at present 24. See supra note 21, http://erc.unesco.org/cp/ conven-
tion.asp?KO=l 5207&language=E.
33. Under article 15, these include the attack upon internationally protected cultural
property, the use of such property in support of military action, and the extensive destruction
or appropriation of cultural property. Supra note 21, art. 15.
34. Joki6, supra note 24, at para. 53.
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... when perpetrated with the requisite discriminatory intent,
[the destruction] amounts to an attack on the very religious iden-
tity of the people. As such it manifests a nearly pure expression
of the notion of 'crimes against humanity' for all of humanity is
indeed injured by the destruction of a unique religious culture
and its concomitant cultural objects.35
This decision is notable also for its recognition that acts of destruc-
tion or wilful damage to cultural property dedicated to religion has been
"... criminalized under customary international law.' 36 In an earlier de-
cision, in the Blaskic case,37 the threshold of persecution set by the
Tribunal in relation to acts of wilful destruction of cultural heritage was
set quite high: the acts must be re-iterated or systematic and must reveal
a pattern of gross violations. Thus not every single act of destruction of
cultural heritage, even of wanton destruction, amounts to the crime of
persecution.
Another important aspect of the intersection between cultural heri-
tage and individual criminal responsibility is the finding by the Trial
Chamber of the ICTY that deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of a
given ethnic group may constitute evidence of the element of mens rea
required for the commission of the crime of genocide.38 This places new
emphasis on the social existence of a group, as opposed to its purely bio-
logical existence, with the consequences that the systematic destruction
of symbolic places and buildings of their culture and religion may reveal,
under appropriate circumstances, the specific intent to destroy in whole
or in part such group within the meaning of genocide under the 1948
Convention.39
35. Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, (ICTY Judgment,
Feb. 26, 2001) at para. 207, available at http://www.un.orglictylkordic/trialc/judgement/kor-
tj010226e.pdf.
36. Id. at para. 206.
37. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14-T, (ICTY TC Judgment, Mar. 3,
2000), available at http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialcl/judgements (concerning inter alia
acts of destruction of cultural property by Croatian leaders).
38. Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY Case No. IT-98-33-T, (ICTY TC Judgment, Aug. 2,
2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/TrialCl/judgement/krs-tj00802e.pdf. This
judgment concerned the massacres committed by military and paramilitary forces of the Serbs
of Bosnia in the city of Srebrenica. The appellate chamber has confirmed the unprecedented
finding that such massacres amounted to genocide in Prosecutor v. Krstic, ICTY Case No. IT-
98-33-4 (ICTY Appeals, Apr. 19 2004), available at http://www.un.org/icty/krstic/Appeal/
judgement/krs-aj040419e.pdf.
39. See id. at para. 579 (citing Dec. 12, 2000 decision of the BundesVerfassungsgerich-
thof (the German Federal Constitutional Court) that the definition of the crime of genocide




Of course, the limit of this jurisprudence, and of the international
norms thereby applied, is that it concerns situations of armed conflict
where protection of cultural heritage is somehow becoming part and par-
cel of humanitarian law and the international protection is a consequence
of the fundamental distinction between military and non-military objec-
tives. However, at least with regard to gross violations of the international
obligation to respect cultural heritage-such as the intentional destruction
of monuments of universal importance-it seems that an opinio juris as to
their unlawful character also in peace time is emerging. This is witnessed
by the world-wide condemnation of the acts of destruction by the Taliban
of the great Buddha of Bamyam in 2001.40 It is confirmed by the resolve
manifested within the UN and UNESCO to clarify that international law
does not tolerate such acts of barbarity, a resolve that has led to the
unanimous adoption in 2003 of the UNESCO Declaration Concerning
Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage. This declaration is an in-
strument of soft law.' It is not a binding treaty. Yet, the fact that it
represents the legal follow-up to a specific act of cultural devastation,
together with the nature of the declaration as the product of the will of
the international community as a whole-because the whole world is
represented in the UNESCO General Conference- 2 makes such instru-
ment a particularly relevant indicator of the sense of obligation that
wilful destruction of cultural heritage, whether in armed conflict or in
peacetime, may entail State responsibility and individual criminal liabil-
ity.
43
In addition to the practice developed in the ICTY and UNESCO, the
linkage between protection of cultural heritage and international responsi-
bility for violations of fundamental rights of individuals and groups has
influenced the case law of specific human rights courts. In a 1999 decision
in the case of Islamic Community of Bosnia v. Rep. Srpska, the Human
Rights Chamber for Bosnia referred to Article 9 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights to support its conclusion that freedom of religion in
40. See supra text accompanying note 21.
41. On the relevance of soft law in contemporary international law, see Francesco Fran-
cioni, International 'Soft Law': A Contemporary Assessment, in FIFTY YEARS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 167 (Lowe &Fitzmaurice eds., 1996); see also P.M. Du-
puy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420 (1991).
42. The universal character of the General Conference at the time of the adoption of this
Declaration is all the more evident by the re-joining of the United States to the Organization.
Today, the only country that appears to be absent from UNESCO is Singapore.
43. See supra note 19, at paras. VI, VII.
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a given community cannot be achieved unless peaceful enjoyment of the
places and buildings dedicated to worship is guaranteed to the people."4
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY
The developments analyzed in the preceding sections show that, un-
der appropriate circumstances, cultural heritage in the territory of any
State may be considered an element of the general interest of the interna-
tional community, and, as such, it must be protected even against the
wishes of the territorial State. This new form of protection entails that,
today, States are bound to tolerate scrutiny and intervention, especially
by competent international organizations, when they wilfully engage in,
or intentionally fail to prevent, the destruction of, or serious damage to,
cultural heritage of significant value for humanity. While this conclusion
leaves open the question of what is the threshold of the "value" of the
item of cultural heritage in order for it to reach the level of common
concern for humanity, it is clear that the increasing number of lists, reg-
isters and inventories established and maintained by competent
international organizations, notably UNESCO, 45 are capable of providing
objective parameters of evaluation and a prima facie certification of the
international significance of a given item of cultural heritage. In this
sense, culture as the common patrimony of humankind becomes an im-
portant tool to counterbalance sovereignty, understood as the complete
and undisturbed dominion over a territorial space, and to foreclose the
objection of "domestic jurisdiction" so often invoked to preserve the
power monopoly of the sovereign State.46
44. See The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. The Republika Srpska,
Case No. CH/96/29, Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, 38 ILM 534
(1999).
45. There are now at least three different instruments aimed at cataloguing cultural
heritage of exceptional importance: the World Heritage List, under the 1972 World Heritage
Convention, which now contains 754 cultural items, available at http://whc.unesco.org/
heritage.htm; the register under the special protection regime of the 1954 Hague Convention,
now updated with the new list for "enhanced protection" under the 1999 Protocol to the Con-
vention, Second Protocol, supra note 21 art. 11; and, finally, the Representative List of the
Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity and the List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need
of Urgent Safeguarding provided for by, respectively, articles 16 and 17 of the Convention for
the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, Oct. 17, 2003, art. 16-7, available at
http://www.unesco.org.
46. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (stating that "[n]othing contained in the present Char-
ter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to set-
tlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII."
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But the impact of the international concern with cultural heritage
goes beyond the territorial dimension of sovereignty. As we have shown
in the preceding sections, cultural heritage is linked to the human ele-
ment. It represents the symbolic continuity of a society beyond its
contingent biological existence. Thus, the obligation to respect cultural
heritage is closely linked with the obligation to respect human rights and
to sanction its most serious breaches with individual criminal liability
under international law.
The recognition of this human dimension of cultural heritage raises
the problem whether international law should shift from a protection of
cultural heritage as the purely material products of the creativity of a
given people or group to the more ambitious goal of safeguarding the
very social structures and processes that permit the generation and
transmission of such products. This brings us to the subject of cultural
diversity as a value to be safeguarded in itself and beyond the value of
the single cultural object.
As is known, contemporary international law has already recognized
"biological diversity" as the common concern of humankind. The 1992
Convention on Biological Diversity47 transcends the traditional approach
based on conservation of individual species and recognizes the intercon-
nected nature of the different components of the global ecosystem.
Hence, the convention recognizes that it is the interest of humanity to
preserve biological diversity as a value in itself, beyond the value of the
single species to be protected.
Should a similar development take place also with respect to cultural
diversity? In addressing this question, certainly one cannot ignore that
there is a difference between culture and nature. Biological diversity,
which finds expression in the infinite variety of forms of life in the bio-
sphere, is more permanent and resilient; it is subject only to the slow
pace of mutation according to the laws of evolution, save for the destruc-
tive impact of human activities. Culture, by contrast is more adaptable. It
is subject to constant exchange and its evolution may be measured
within the span of generations rather than millennia.
While these differences are real, there is no plausible reason for
holding that the more dynamic and adaptable character of culture should
be an obstacle to the legal recognition of the value of cultural diversity
and of the need to safeguard such diversity as a general interest of hu-
manity.
On the contrary, the evolutionary character of culture requires the
maintenance of robust cultural traditions whose richness and diversity
47. See Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, available at http://
www.biodiv.org/convention/larticles.asp.
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permit fruitful exchange and interaction between different peoples and
world views. International law cannot remain indifferent to this task.
First, because the present state of economic globalization is generating
an increasing concern with the prospect of a uniform commercial mono-
culture and with the destabilizing effects that this may entail in terms of
loss of social cohesion and identity in national societies. Second, be-
cause only international law, rather than individual sovereign States, may
perform the pedagogical role needed to bridge the gap of diffidence and
hostility between different civilizations and world views that globaliza-
tion has unleashed and that we urgently need to re-compose today in the
complex puzzle of shared humanity. How badly we need international
law in pursuing this goal is proven, unfortunately, by the current increase
in violent conflict and terrorism as a consequence of the attempt to uni-
laterally transplant, by force, democracy and free market in countries
where different social structures and complex cultural traditions prevail.41
Thus, if international law has a role to play in the safeguarding of
cultural diversity, 9 how has this role been performed and what results
have been achieved so far? I shall try to respond to this question by ex-
amining two important developments that are currently contributing to
the emergence in international law of a common concern for the safe-
guarding of cultural diversity. I refer to the recent movement toward the
adoption of an international regime for the protection of the immaterial
elements of living cultures, what we call intangible cultural heritage, and
the present effort toward the adoption of a universal treaty on cultural
diversity.
A. Intangible Cultural Heritage
The concept of "intangible cultural heritage" covers an infinite vari-
ety of manifestations of a living culture as opposed to the material
products-movable or immovable-that have been the object of interna-
tional protection in the past.0 As possible examples, one may think of
48. Iraq is only the latest and most tragic example. On the link between unilateral ex-
portation of democracy and the rise of violence and conflict see A. CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE.
How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTA-
BILITY (2002).
49. On this matter, see F. Lenzerini, Riflessioni sul valore della diversiti culturale nel
diritto intemazionale, 46 COMUNITX, INTERNAZIONALE 671 (2001).
50. See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Nov. 2,
2001, available at http://www.unesco.org/culture.laws/underwater/html-eng/convention.shtml;
UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, avail-
able at http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/c-cult.htm; Convention for the Protection
of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, supra note 18; Convention on the Means of Pro-
hibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural
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typical forms of musical expression: literary and oral traditions; poetry,
languages, theatre, dance and mime; religious traditions and rituals;
crafts and skills; choreography and costumes; agricultural practices; in-
digenous medicinal practices linked with knowledge of plants; social
methods of dispute settlement and other forms of traditional creativity
that anthropologists generally catalogue as "folklife." So many forms of
immaterial cultural heritage have one feature in common; all of them
provide elements to define the identity of a cultural community with its
specific social and intellectual processes and distinct world view. This
specificity characterizes the relevant cultural community in relation to
the broader framework of the sovereign State; its speciality or unique-
ness becomes an appealing symbol of community identity.
An early recognition of the international relevance of these living
aspects of culture was the UNESCO Recommendation on the Safeguard-
ing of Traditional Culture and Folklore.5 ' This recommendation was
adopted by the General Conference in 1989 after several years of diffi-
cult deliberations mainly due to the dilemma whether to protect
traditional culture by way of intellectual property rights or through a
separate normative instrument. The 1989 Recommendation shunned this
dilemma by limiting its role to the enunciation of a set of general princi-
ples and guidelines of a non-binding character. 2
In the period immediately following the adoption of the UNESCO
Recommendation little progress was made toward effective protection of
intangible cultural heritage. The implementation of the UNESCO Rec-
ommendation in domestic law was generally inadequate. Many countries
continued to have no laws, administrative measures or customary rules to
specially safeguard intangible cultural heritage. Identification and cata-
loguing of traditional culture remained lacking thus preventing the very
visibility of such culture for the purpose of its legal protection. In re-
sponse to these shortcomings, in the mid 1990's a new interest and a new
approach began to emerge. In 1994, UNESCO adopted the Guidelines
on Living Human Treasures, 3 which, following the example set in Asia
by countries such as Japan and Korea, aimed at developing incentives
and legislation to support the survival of old craft skills which, although
not capable of generating sufficient income in a market economy, are
Property, Nov. 14 1970, available at http://www.unesco.org; Hague Convention, supra note
14.
51. Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and Folklore, Nov. 15,
1989, available at http://www.unesco.org.
52. The principles are grouped in six parts: A. Definition of Folklore; B. Identification;
C. Conservation; D. Preservation; E. Dissemination; F. Protection; G. International Coopera-
tion. Id.
53. Guidelines on Living Human Treasures, at http://www.unesco.org/culture/heritage/
intangible/treasures/htmleng/method.shtml.
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nevertheless an important component of the social fabric and an essential
condition for the maintenance and restoration of the material heritage. In
1997, UNESCO launched another initiative relevant to intangible heri-
tage via the program entitled, Proclamation of Masterpieces of Oral and
Intangible Heritage. This program was specifically aimed at the recogni-
tion and listing of outstanding forms and traditional culture. The first
round took place in 2001 and led to the proclamation of some extremely
valuable forms of intangible cultural heritage in the different cultural
regions of the world,54 as well as the second proclamation, which took
place in 2003."5
Building on these two initiatives, as well as on a series of regional
seminars, UNESCO and the Smithsonian Institution organized in 1999
in Washington, D.C. a conference entitled "A Global Assessment of the
1989 Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional Culture and.- ,,16
Folklore: Local Empowerment and International Cooperation. The
conclusions of the Washington conference contained substantive recom-
mendations and an operational resolution. The recommendations
reiterated the necessity of adopting a more inclusive definition of intan-
gible cultural heritage, going beyond the concepts of folklore and of
popular culture used in the 1989 UNESCO Recommendation. More im-
portant, it highlighted the need to put at the center of the system of
protection the peoples, groups and communities that are the creators and
bearers of intangible cultural heritage. This represented an important
shift as compared to the approach adopted in the past of giving overrid-
ing priority to the interest of scientific research thus relegating cultural
communities to mere objects of study and investigation. The operational
resolution consisted in a request to UNESCO to undertake a feasibility
54. For example, among the nineteen masterpieces proclaimed in 2001, the following
were selected: Kunqu Opera from China; The Cultural Space of the Brotherhood of the Holy
Spirit of the Congos of Villa Mella from Dominican Republic; The Oral Heritage and Cultural
Manifestations of the Zpara People from Ecuador and Peru; Georgian Polyphonic Singing
from Georgia; Kuttiyattam Sanskrit Theatre from India; Opera dei Pupi, Sicilian Puppet Thea-
tre from Italy; N6gaku Theatre from Japan; Cross Crafting and its Symbolism from Lithuania;
The Cultural Space of Djamaa el-Fna Square from Morocco. List of Masterpieces of the Oral
and Intangible Heritage of Humanity, at http://www.portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-
URLID=21274&URLDO=DOTopic&URLSection=201 .html.
55. Among the twenty-eight masterpieces selected in 2003, one may cite the oral tradi-
tions of the Aka Pygmies of Central Africa from Central African Republic, The Baltic Song
and Dance Celebrations from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, The Andean Cosmovision of the
Kallawaya from Bolivia, the Iraqi Maqam, The Royal Ballet of Cambodia and the Vanuatu
Sand Drawings. Id.
56. A Global Assessment of the 1989 Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Tradi-




study in view of the adoption of a new normative instrument on the safe-
guarding of traditional culture.
It is against this background that between 2001 and 2003, negotia-
tions were undertaken within the framework of UNESCO. In October,
2003, a new Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural heri-
tage was adopted unanimously by the General Conference.57 This
convention defines intangible cultural heritage as "the practices, repre-
sentations, expressions, knowledge, skills-as well as the instruments,
objects, artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith-that commu-
nities, groups and, in some cases, individuals recognize as part of their
cultural heritage." 8 The rationale of the convention lies in the idea that
the protection of intangible cultural heritage has not only the purpose of
safeguarding national interests belonging to each sovereign State, but,
particularly, the value of such heritage "as a mainspring of cultural di-
versity,"'59 corresponding to a "common concern" of the international
community as a whole. 60 In this sense, the close interrelation between
cultural diversity and intangible heritage is stressed by the second part of
the definition, according to which "[such] heritage, transmitted from
generation to generation, is constantly recreated by communities and
groups in response to their environment, their interaction with nature and
their history, and provides them with a sense of identity and continuity,
thus promoting respect for cultural diversity and human creativity.
' 6'
Consistently, the convention text emphasizes the role "of communities,
groups and, where appropriate, individuals that create, maintain and
transmit [intangible cultural] heritage, 62 stressing the necessity that their
participation is ensured "[w]ithin the framework of [each State Party]
safeguarding activities of [such] heritage' 63 and in the context of the
identification and definition of its various elements!" It is nevertheless
regrettable that representatives of the above communities and groups are
not included among the members of the Intergovernmental Committee
for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, which is only
57. Convention on the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, supra note 45.
58. Id. at art. 2. This definition was elaborated by a group of independent experts,
chaired by the present writer, who met in Grinzane Cavour, Turin, Italy, in March, 2001. This
meeting, organized by UNESCO, was meant to be, and actually was, the first step of the work
which led to the adoption of the Convention by the UNESCO General Conference in October
2003.
59. Id. at pmbl.
60. Id.
61. Id. at art. 2.
62. Id. at art. 15.
63. Id.
64. See id. at art. 11 (b).
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composed of State representatives.5 The Committee has the competence,
inter alia, of selecting the items of intangible heritage to be safeguarded
at the international level according to Chapter IV of the convention. This
circumstance is capable of weakening the role played by the peoples
concerned in the operation of the convention and, a fortiori, its proper
functioning and effectiveness, since only such peoples own the appropri-
ate knowledge, skills and ability for properly managing and safeguarding
the intangible heritage they have created and transmitted from generation
to generation.
B. Diversity of Cultural Contents
and Artistic Expressions
While the concept of intangible cultural heritage operates directly
within the sphere of national sovereignty in that it entails empowering
non-state actors, i.e. peoples and local communities, with a claim to legal
protection under international law, the concept of cultural diversity takes
this process a step further and introduces the concept of "humanity" as
the new "non-state actor" entitled to the safeguarding of cultural diver-
sity as a common patrimony to be preserved in the public interest to be
transmitted to future generations. Although no binding treaty has been
adopted yet to directly protect and promote cultural diversity, several soft
law instruments have already occupied the field and a new convention is
now being negotiated within the framework of UNESCO.
The first instrument to be mentioned is the 1966 UNESCO Declara-
tion of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, 66 whose
Article 1 proclaims that "in their rich variety and diversity, and in the
reciprocal influences they exert on one another, all cultures form part of
the common heritage belonging to all mankind." The 1992 UN General
Assembly Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
67
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities reiterated at Articles 1 and
4 that pluralism and cultural diversity form part of the general interest of
humanity. Finally, in 2001, the General Conference of UNESCO adopted
the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity,68 whose Article 1 ex-
pressly states that "as a source of exchange, innovation and creativity,
cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for
nature: in this sense, it is the common heritage of humanity and should
be recognized and affirmed for the benefit of the present and future gen-
65. See id. at art. 5.
66. Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, Nov. 4, 1966,
UNESCO, art. 1, available at http://www.unesco.org.
67. See supra note 2.




erations." On the basis of this statement, the declaration stresses the in-
separability of the defense of cultural diversity from human rights, both
in the sense that the former implies a commitment to the fulfilment of
human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular of minorities and
indigenous peoples, and in the sense that cultural diversity may not be
invoked as an excuse to infringe upon human rights guaranteed by inter-
national law.69 Further, the declaration proclaims cultural heritage as the
"wellspring of creativity" because "creation draws on the roots of cul-
tural tradition, but flourishes in contact with other cultures. For this
reason, heritage in all its forms must be preserved, enhanced and handed
on to future generations as a record of human experience and aspirations,
so as to foster creativity in all its diversity."7° This entails that cultural
products and services should be treated not as mere commodities but as
"vectors of identity, values and meaning" and that in the present context of
globalization the free flow of ideas and works should be made compatible
with "... the production and dissemination of diversified cultural goods
and services through cultural industries that have the means to assert
themselves at the local and global level.
' 7'
As often happens in international law, the adoption of a soft law in-
strument is only the first step toward the establishment of a binding legal
regime. This has happened also with the Universal Declaration on Cul-
tural Diversity. In October, 2003, the UNESCO General Conference, on
the basis of a comprehensive preliminary study on the technical and le-
gal aspects relating to the desirability of a standard setting-instrument on
cultural diversity, approved a resolution deciding that the question of
cultural diversity "must be regulated by an international convention." It
was mandating that the UNESCO Director-General submit to the 33rd
Session of the General Conference (Fall, 2005) a report on the negotiat-
ing progress and a first draft of a Convention on the Protection of the
Diversity of Cultural Contents and Artistic Expressions.2
The protection of cultural diversity as the common heritage of hu-
manity is now on the international agenda. The negotiations currently
taking place73 are not likely to produce a quick result. Opposition still
69. See id. at art. 4 (stating, inter alia, that "[n]o one may invoke cultural diversity to
infringe upon human rights guaranteed by international law, nor to limit their scope)."
70. See id.
71. See id. at art. 9.
72. See Desirability of Drawing Up an International Standard-Setting Instrument on
Cultural Diversity, July 1, 2003, UNESCO General Conference, Resolution 32C/52, para. 25,
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001307/130798e.pdf.
73. At the time of this writing (April 2004), two rounds of negotiations of governmental
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remains from certain powerful States based on the fear that the future
Convention may allow States to raise barriers to the free circulation of
cultural products and services.74 A difficult challenge lies ahead in terms
of tuning the UNESCO work with the existing commitment of its mem-
bers with the WTO and the TRIPS agreements. 7' But in spite of these
uncertainties, for the purpose of our discussion, the work of UNESCO
and the international practice developing in connection with it has made
abundantly clear that the international community has recognized cul-
tural diversity as the common heritage of humanity. By doing so, it has
removed cultural heritage from the exclusive control of national sover-
eignty; it has empowered the non-state actors represented by the peoples
and communities who are the bearers of such heritage to claim interna-
tional protection, if necessary, even against their national State or against
third parties. Ultimately, it has made humanity as such the title holder of
the general interest to the protection and transmission of cultural diver-
sity as the common and indivisible patrimony of human civilization.
74. See The Intervention by the United States Delegation at the UNESCO 32nd General
Conference, Meeting of the Committee on Culture, Oct. 13, 2003.
75. One should not forget that all WTO Members are also members of UNESCO (with
the only extravagant exception of Singapore). On the interaction between culture and trade,
see Bruno De Witte, Trade in Culture: International Legal Regimes and EU Constitutional
Values, in THE EU AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 237 (De Burca &
Scott eds., 2001).
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